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Why do some sellers set nominal prices that apparently do not respond to changes in the
aggregate price level? In many models, prices are sticky by assumption; here it is a result.
We use search theory, with two consequences: prices are set in dollars, since money is the
medium of exchange; and equilibrium implies a nondegenerate price distribution. When the
money supply increases, some sellers may keep prices constant, earning less per unit but
making it up on volume, so proﬁt stays constant. The calibrated model matches price-change
data well. But, in contrast with other sticky-price models, money is neutral.
JEL numbers: E52, E31, E42
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––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––—1 Introduction
Arguably the most diﬃcult question in macroeconomics is this: Why do some sellers set
prices in nominal terms that apparently do not adjust in response to changes in the aggregate
price level. This seems to ﬂy in the face of elementary microeconomic principles. Shouldn’t
every seller have a target relative price, depending on real factors, and therefore when the
aggregate nominal price level increases by some amount, say due to an increase in the money
supply, shouldn’t every seller necessarily adjust his nominal price by the same amount? In
many popular macro models, including those used by most policy makers, prices are sticky
by assumption, in the sense that there are either restrictions on how often they can change,
following Taylor (1980) or Calvo (1983), or there are real resource costs to changing them,
following Mankiw (1985). We deliver stickiness as a result, in the sense that sellers set
prices in nominal terms, and some may choose not to adjust in response to changes in the
aggregate price level, even though we let them change whenever they like and at no cost.
Moreover, in contrast with other theories with sticky prices, we construct our model so
that money is neutral: the central bank cannot engineer a boom or end a slump simply by
issuing currency. Hence, while our theory provides microfoundations for the core ingredient
in Keynesian economics — sticky prices or nominal rigidities — it has rather diﬀerent policy
implications.
We emphasize at the outset that our objective here is not to establish that monetary
policy is neutral or nonneutral in the real world. That is beside the point. Our objective
is to show formally two other results: (1) one does not need to introduce technological
restrictions or costs, as in Calvo- or Mankiw-style models, to generate price stickiness; and
(2) the appearance of nominal rigidities in the real world does not logically imply that policy
can exploit these rigidities, as some economists think. To explain our motivation by analogy
to a rather famous paper, Lucas (1972) describes a microfounded monetary model consistent
with the observation that, in the data, there is a positive correlation between the aggregate
price level (or money supply) and output (or employment), but policy cannot systematically
exploit the relationship. That is, increasing inﬂation by printing money at a faster rate will
not increase average output or employment. We think this was a good lesson. We similarly
2want to show that one can write down a microfounded monetary model consistent with some
other observations, those concerning nominal price adjustments, but it is not possible for
policy to exploit this. Monetary policy is neutral in the model by design —t h i si sh o ww e
make point (2) above, that price stickiness does not logically imply nonneutrality.1
N o to n l yd oe so u rm od e lp r o v i d ec o u n t e r e x a m p l e st os o m ep o p u l a rbe l i e f sa bo u tm o n e t a r y
theory and policy, we also argue that it is empirically reasonable in the following sense. We
show that our approach to price stickiness is successful, relative to alternative theories,
at matching the salient features of the micro data on individual price dynamics.2 We can
account for the average duration of prices in the data, for the fact that price changes are large
on average, even though many changes are small, and that prices change more frequently
(and not just by larger amounts) when inﬂation is higher. In contrast, simple menu-cost
theories cannot easily account for the second fact — that on average price changes are large
even though many changes are small — while Calvo theories cannot easily account for the
third — that the frequency of price changes increases with inﬂation. It is not our claim
that somehow complicating or integrating existing theories cannot work, and there are some
reasonably successful attempts in the literature, including e.g. Midrigan (2006). Our claim
is that even a very basic version of our theory does a good job matching the facts.
We think these ﬁndings are relevant for several reasons. First, despite the successes of,
say, the New Classical and Real Business Cycle paradigms, they seem to miss one basic
feature of the data: at least some nominal prices seem sticky in the sense deﬁned above (they
do not respond to changes in the aggregate price level). One should want to know if this
somehow invalidates these theories or their policy implications, and means the only valid
theories and recommendation emanate from a Keynesian approach. It seems clear to us that
the observation of price stickiness is one of main reasons why many Keynesians are Keynesian.
Consider Ball and Mankiw (1994), who we think representative, when they say: “We believe
that sticky prices provide the most natural explanation of monetary nonneutrality since so
1To be clear, it is not the case that monetary policy in the model has no impact: changing the inﬂation
or nominal interest rate has real consequences, as in any good monetary model, but this has nothing to do
with nominal rigidities.
2Empirical work on price stickiness includes, e.g., Cecchetti (1985), Carlson (1986), Bils and Klenow
(2005), Campbell and Eden (2007), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2009), Eichen-
baum, Jamovich and Rebelo (2009) and Gagnon (2009). See Klenow and Malin (2010) for a survey.
3many prices are, in fact, sticky.” They go on to claim that “based on microeconomic evidence,
we believe that sluggish price adjustment is the best explanation for monetary nonneutrality.”
And, “As a matter of logic, nominal stickiness requires a cost of nominal adjustment.” Some
others that one might not think of as Keynesian present similar positions, including Golosov
and Lucas (2003), who argue that “menu costs are really there: The fact that many individual
goods prices remain ﬁxed for weeks or months in the face of continuously changing demand
and supply conditions testiﬁes conclusively to the existence of a ﬁxed cost of repricing.”3
We interpret the above claims as containing three points related, respectively, to empirics,
theory, and policy. The ﬁrst claim is that price stickiness is a fact. The quotations assert this,
and it is substantiated by numerous empirical studies. We concede the point. The second
claim is that price stickiness implies “as a matter of logic” the existence of some technological
constraint to price adjustment. We prove this wrong. We do so by displaying equilibria that
match not only the broad observation of price stickiness, but also some of the more detailed
empirical ﬁndings, with recourse to no technological constraints. The third claim, to which
at least Ball and Mankiw seem to subscribe, is that price stickiness implies that money is not
neutral and that this rationalizes Keynesian policy advice. We also prove this wrong. Our
theory is consistent with the relevant observations, but money is neutral, which means that
sticky prices simply do not constitute deﬁnitive evidence that money is nonneutral or that
particular policy recommendations are warranted. To reiterate, that the point here is not
about whether money is neutral is the real world, it is rather about constructing a coherent,
and we think compelling, economic environment with two properties: (1) it matches the
sticky-price facts; and (2) it nevertheless delivers neutrality.
3The point here is not to pick on any particular individuals, but to pick out some that apparently come
from diﬀerent macro camps, in order to convey a general feeling in the profession about the implications of
price stickness. Another example, from a leading macro theorist who recently became a monetary policy
maker, is Kocherlakota (2009): “If the Federal Reserve injects a lot of money into the economy, then there
is more money chasing fewer goods. This extra money puts upward pressure on prices. If all ﬁrms changed
prices continuuously, then this upward pressure would manifest itself in an immediate jump in the price level.
But this immediate jump would have little eﬀect on the economy. Essentially, such a change would be like a
simple change of units (akin to recalculating distances in inches instead of feet). In the real world, though,
ﬁrms change prices ony infrequently. It is impossible for the increase in money to generate an immediate
jump in the price level. Instead, since most prices remain ﬁxed, the extra money generates more demand
on the part of households and in that way generates more production. Eventually, prices adjust, and these
eﬀects on demand and production vanish. But infrequent price adjustment means that monetary policy can
have short-run eﬀects on real output.”
4It is clear that the issues at hand concern monetary phenomena: Why are prices quoted in
dollars? Why do they not all adjust to changes in the money supply? What does this imply
about central bank policy? To study these questions, is seems natural to use a monetary
model. We work with a version of the New Monetarist framework, recently surveyed by
Williamson and Wright (2010a,b) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2011). This framework tries to
be explicit about details of the trading process, so that one can ask, who trades with whom,
and how? Thus, specialization and search frictions can limit barter, while commitment and
information frictions can limit credit, making money essential for at least some exchange.
Because the points we make are really quite general, we could also make them with other
monetary models, including cash-in-advance, money-in-the-utility-function or overlapping-
generations models, but we think a search-based approach is useful, for several reasons. First,
it is the approach used by most people doing monetary theory (if not monetary policy) these
days. Also, the framework has proved very tractable and easily generalizable in a variety of
other applications. And, more signiﬁcantly, a search-based approach not only can generate
a role for money, it can generate endogenous price dispersion, which is an important element
of our theory.
To explain this idea, ﬁrst note that many New Keynesian models, such as those described
in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) or Woodford (2003), generate price dispersion if and only
if there is inﬂation. Suppose in a stationary real environment a number of sellers set the same
 at date .T h e n ,a t1  ,s o m es e l l e ri st h eﬁrst one allowed to change price and changes it
to 1,a td a t e2  1 a second seller is allowed to change, etc. This induces price dispersion
if and only if inﬂation is not zero. But the data suggest that there is price dispersion
even during periods of low or zero inﬂation (something we ﬁrst noticed in Campbell and
Eden 2007). This suggests that it is important to work with models that can deliver price
dispersion even without inﬂation. There are several candidate models, including Varian
(1980), Albrecht and Axel (1984) or Stahl (1989), but we use Burdett and Judd (1983).
In Burdett-Judd models, search frictions deliver price dispersion, and these same frictions
help generate a role for money. Hence, it is parsimonious in terms of assumptions to use
a search-based framework for the issues at hand. Burdett-Judd has also proved useful in
other applications, including the large literature on labor markets following Burdett and
5Mortensen (1998) (see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 for a survey).
To understand Burdett-Judd, it helps to give a very brief history of search theory. The
earliest models of McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970) were partial equilibrium models, in
the sense that they characterized the optimal search strategy of a searcher taking as given
the distribution of prices (or wages in labor applications) posted by ﬁrms, and were soundly
criticized on this point (e.g., Rothschild 1973). Diamond (1971) set out to build a general
equilibrium search model in which the price distribution was derived endogenously: ﬁrst
ﬁrms post prices, taken as given the prices of others; then individuals search over these
ﬁrms as in the standard theory. What he found is that there is a unique equilibrium and
it entails a degenerate price distribution. The proof is easy. Given any (), individuals
use a reservation price , buying when they sample the ﬁrst  ≤ . But then there is no
reason for any ﬁrm to set anything other than  = . This proves equilibrium must have a
single price. Moreover, the single price turns out to be the pure monopoly price. Since there
cannot be price dispersion, the result seemed bad for search theory, but also set oﬀ aw a v e
of research on trying to generate dispersion.
The approach in Burdett and Judd (1983) is to make one, ostensibly minimal, change in
the standard sequential search model: rather than sampling prices one at a time, suppose
there is a positive probability of sampling two (or more) at once. Then it is not hard to
see that equilibrium must entail a nondegenerate price distribution. We are more precise
when we present the formal model, but the idea is this. Suppose all sellers in some set (with
positive measure) set the same . A buyer who samples two such sellers has to use some
tie-breaking rule to pick one. This gives an individual seller a big incentive to lower price,
to get the sale for sure. In fact, in equilibrium, all sellers charge diﬀerent prices, and one
can actually derived the closed-form solution for the distribution  (). The model captures
standard results as special cases: when the probability that a buyer meets two or more sellers
approaches 1, we converge to a single price and it is the perfectly competitive price; and when
this probability approaches 0,w ec o n v e r g et oD i a m o n d ’ sm o n o p o l yp r i c e .
We embed Burdett-Judd pricing into a dynamic New Monetarist model, where agents
alternate between trading in centralized and decentralized markets, and in the former market
6buyers use money as a medium of exchange because frictions preclude the use of credit.4 In
equilibrium, sellers post prices in dollars, naturally, since this is how buyers are paying. As
in the baseline Burdett-Judd model, at any date , there is a continuous distribution of prices
 () with nondegenerate support [
]. While the equilibrium pins down the distribution,
it does not pin down the price of an individual seller: every seller gets the same proﬁtf r o m
any  ∈ [
], because one that posts a low price earns less per unit but makes it up on the
volume. When the money supply increases from  to +1, the equilibrium distribution
shifts to +1 () with support [
+1+1]. For this to happen, some sellers must change their
prices, but not all of them: if an individual seller’s price is   ∈ [
+1+1] it must adjust;
but if  ∈ [
+1+1] it may not.
As regards the question with which we started — Shouldn’t every seller have a target real
price, and therefore when  increases shouldn’t every seller adjust his nominal price by the
same amount? — the answer is No! Sellers do not have a unique target price. Equilibrium
requires a distribution of prices all of which yield the same proﬁt. If you do not change your
 when  increases, you indeed earn less proﬁt per unit, but again you make it up on the
volume. Hence, sellers can change prices infrequently in the face of continuous movements
in the aggregate price level, even though they are allowed to change whenever they like at
no cost. One might say that sellers can be rationally inattentive to the aggregate price level
and monetary policy, within some range, since as long as  ∈ [
], their place in this
distribution does not matter. But policy cannot exploit this. The distribution of relative
prices is pinned down uniquely, and if, say,  were to unexpectedly double,  () must
adjust to keep the real distribution the same, even if many individual prices do not adjust.
Hence, the level of the money supply  is irrelevant, even if inﬂation, nominal interest or
money growth rates matter. This is classical neutrality.5
4This alternating-market structure is taken from Lagos and Wright (2005), mainly because it is extremely
tractable, but as we said any other monetary model could be used. Prevous analyses in this framework have
used several diﬀerent pricing mechanisms, including various bargaining solutions, price posting with directed
search, Walrasian price taking, and auctions (see the above-mentioned surveys). No one has previously tried
Burdett-Judd pricing in the model, although it was used in the related model of Shi (197) by Head and
Kumar (2005) and Head, Kumar and Lapham (2010).
5Although we focus in this application on changes in , the same argument applies to what Golosov
and Lucas (2003) call “continuously changing demand and supply conditions.” Any change in utility or cost
funtions can change the Burdett-Judd price distribution, but this simply does not imply that all sellers must
adjust their individual prices.
7We then show that a calibrated version of the model can match quite well the empirical
behavior of prices in the US retail sector. First, the calibrated model predicts an average
price duration that is reasonably close to what one sees in the data. Second, our theory gen-
erates a price change distribution that has the same shape and the features of the empirical
price change distribution — e.g., the average price change is large, yet there are many small
changes, and even many negative price changes. Third, in the model the probability and
magnitude of price adjustments are approximately independent of the time since the last ad-
justment, as in the data. Fourth, the theory correctly predicts that inﬂation increases both
the frequency and the magnitude of price changes. Overall, our model of price stickiness
appears empirically reasonable. But, again, money is neutral. This demonstrates formally
that nominal stickiness neither requires technological restrictions on price adjustment nor
justiﬁes particular interventions by central banks.6
2 The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. In every period, two markets open sequentially.
We call the ﬁrst the Burdett-Judd market, or BJ for short, a decentralized market for a
consumption good  in which buyers and sellers meet through a frictional matching process.
Here barter is not feasible since buyers have nothing to oﬀer by way of quid pro quo,a n d
credit is not feasible because they are anonymous. Hence, exchange takes place using ﬁat
money, supplied by the government according to the rule +1 = ,w h e r e  1
is the money growth rate at . After the BJ market closes, there convenes a centralized
m a r k e tw h e r ea g e n t st r a d ead i ﬀerent good ,a sw e l la sl a b o r and money , called the
Arrow-Debreu market, or AD for short. In AD households receive a lump sum transfer (or
tax)  to accommodate increases (or decreases) in . Also, in this market, as in standard
6There are several other interesting models where, despite price stickiness, money may be (sometimes
approximately) neutral. These include Caplin and Spulber (1987), Eden (1994), and Golosov and Lucas
(2007). Our approach diﬀers in a number of respects. First, we start with a general equilibrium model
where money is essential. Second, by design, money is exactly neutral. Third, stickiness arises entirely
endogenously and robustly — it does not depend on particular functional forms, timing, the money supply
process, etc. Fourth, the distribtion of prices is endogenous, derived from standard microeconomics (Burdett-
Judd), instead of simply assuming, say, prices are distributed uniformly (as in Caplin-Spulber). Also, we
take our model to the data, as do some (e.g., Golosov and Lucas 2007) but not all (e.g., Caplin and Spulber
1987) of the above-mentioned studies
8general equilibrium theory, we cannot say who trades with whom or how — the approach
does not allow one to ask if they use barter, money or credit, only requiring that household
satisfy their budget equations and markets clear.7
There is a continuum of households with measure 1. Each household has preferences
described by the utility function
X∞
=0 
[()+() − ] (2.1)
where  ∈ (01) is the discount factor, while  and  are strictly increasing and concave
functions over the BJ good and AD good, respectively. There is a continuum of ﬁrms with
measure . Firms operate technologies for producing goods described as follows: producing
au n i to f requires  =  hours of labor, and producing a unit of  requires  =  hours
of labor, so that  is the constant marginal cost of producing the BJ goods in terms of
AD goods. As in standard general equilibrium theory, households own the ﬁrms, and receive
proﬁts as dividends , in dollars, in the AD market.8
I nt h eB Jm a r k e ta t,e a c hﬁrm posts a nominal price , taking as given the distribution
of prices posted by all the other ﬁrms, described by the CDF (),a sw e l la st h ed i s t r i b u t i o n
of money across buyers in the market, in general, although in this model that is degenerate —
i.e., along the equilibrium path,  =  for each household in the BJ market. Households
know the distribution (), but only contact and hence can only purchase from a random
sample of BJ sellers. A household generally contacts  ﬁrms with probability .F o r
simplicity we assume 0 ∈ [01), 1 ∈ (01−0) and 2 =1−0 −1, so that a household
contacts at most two ﬁrms. One can easily generalize this in a variety of without changing
the substantive results (e.g., as in Mortensen 2005); one can also allow households to choose
7The role of money in the BJ market is basicaly the same as Kiyotaki and Wright (1989); see Kocherlakota
(1998) or Wallace (2011) for rigorous discussions. Also, one should not worry about the assumption that
changes in  are accomplished via lump sum transfers or taxes. It is equivalent for all we do here to have
the government to use increases or decreases in  to buy more or fewer AD goods (all that would change
for the households is ).
8The baseline assumption is that  is produced in the AD market, and carried into the next BJ market
by ﬁrms, who know exactly how much they will sell as a function of their price by the law of large numbers
(and we do not dwell here on technicalities regarding the conditions needed for this law to apply). This
allows us to interpret ﬁrms as simply technologies, owned by households, as in standard general equilibriuim
theory, but is usually equivalent if not more convenient to alternatively interpret ﬁrms as individuals who
produce and consume (see Section 3).
9endogenously how many sellers they sample at some cost (e.g., as in the original Burdett-
Judd 1983 paper) and show that in equilibrium we get 1 2 ∈ (01) and  =0∀2.
Also, although for ease of notation we assume all trade in the BJ market is monetary, it easy
to allow some credit trades, since for money to be essential we only need to have some BJ
trade where credit is unavailable (see Head et al. 2011).
Before proceeding, we mention that we are aware that there are options for the types of
mechanisms ﬁrms can post. In principle, they could post menus, where buyers can have any
, perhaps in some set ,f o rap a y m e n t (), but here we impose linearity,  ()=.9
We experimented with alternatives, but thought the linear case was suﬃciently interesting
to focus on it for now. We also studied a version of the model where BJ goods are indivisible
(see Liu 2010 or Head et al. 2011), which avoids the issue, since the only option is to post a 
giving the price for an indivisible unit. That version is easier on some dimensions, although it
also has some problems — e.g., as is well known, monetary models with indivisible goods and
price posting admit a multiplicity of equilibria (see Jean, Rabinovich and Wright 2010 and
references therein). At some level, this multiplicity does not matter, since all the equilibria
are qualitatively similar, but it is slightly inconvenient, and so we use divisible goods here.
2.1 Households’ Problem
Let () and () be the value functions for a household with  dollars in the AD
and BJ market, respectively. Let  be the value of money (the inverse of the nominal price
level) in AD, where the price of  and the real wage are both 1 given our technology. Then
the AD problem for a household is
()= m a x
ˆ 
{() −  + +1(ˆ )} st  =  +  ( − ˆ  +  + )
with nonnegativity constraints implicit. Eliminating  using the budget equation, we can
reduce this to
()= ( +  + )+m a x
 ˆ 
{() −  +  − ˆ  + +1(ˆ )} (2.2)
9Ennis (2001) and Dong and Jiang (2011), e.g., study related monetary models where nonlinear pricing
is used by sellers to elicit private information about buyers’ preferences.





plus the budget constraint,  = + (ˆ  −  −  − ).T h i si m p l i e s :( 1 )ˆ  and  are
independent of , so that in particular the equilibrium distribution money is degenerate
across households entering the BJ market; and (2)  is linear with slope .
For a household in the BJ market with  dollars, conditional on sampling at least one
p r i c ea n dt h el o w e s tp r i c es a m p l e db e i n g,w ed e ﬁne
()=m a x

{()+ ( − )} st  ≤ 
Thus,  =  () solves an elementary demand problem with liquidity constraint  ≤
. It is easy to show the diﬀerence between the slopes in () space of the unconstrained
d e m a n dc u r v ea n dt h ec o n s t r a i n ta te q u a l i t yh a st h es a m es i g na s1− () when the curves
cross, where  ()=00()0 () is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. It is convenient
to have a single crossing, so that the constraint binds either for high  or for low ,a n da
suﬃcient condition for this is either  ()  1 ∀ or  ()  1 ∀. We assume constant relative
risk aversion, ()=
1−
 (1 − ), and assume  ∈ (01), so that demand is constrained at
low  (see Liu 2010 for the case 1, and for results with a general function ).








+  ( − )
¾
st  ≤  (2.4)
This is easily solved to get
()=
(
 if  ≤ ˆ 
()
− 1
 if ˆ 
(2.5)





−1.I fˆ  households cash out; otherwise ()  ,s ot h e yh a v e
money to spare and demand is unconstrained. This is shown in Figure 1, where constrained
demand is given by the lower envelope of the two curves representing unconstrained demand
and the constraint at equality.
11The unconditional value function entering the BJ market, before potentially contacting







1 − [1 − ()]
2ª

This expression is easy to understand: with probability 0 the household contacts no seller
and enters the next AD market with  unchanged; with probability 1 the household
contacts one seller posting a random draw from (); and with probability 2 the household
contacts two ﬁrms and the lower of the two prices is a random draw from 1 − [1 − ()]2.
Simple algebra reduces this to
()=0()+
Z
[1 +2 2 − 22()]()() (2.6)




















Although we focus on stationary equilibria below, for now we do not impose this restric-
tion. In general, the inﬂation rate is  = +1, and the Fisher equation gives the nominal
interest rate by 1+ =( 1+)(1+),w h e r e1+ =1  is the real interest rate, which is
time invariant here due to quasi-linear utility. To be clear, as is standard, we can obviously
price any asset in equilibrium, including real or nominal claims between the AD market at 
and the AD market at +1, even if these do not circulate in the BJ market (say, because they
are not tangible assets, simply claims on numeraire goods or money in AD). This deﬁnes the















Heuristically, the LHS of (2.7) is the marginal cost of carrying cash between  and +1,t h e
nominal interest rate; and the RHS is the marginal beneﬁt, the expected value of relaxing
the liquidity constraint in the next BJ market which binds when ˆ +1.
122.2 Firms’ Problem




[1 +2 2 − 22()+2()](), (2.8)
where ()=l i m →0+ () − ( − ),a n d() is proﬁt per buyer served, given that in
equilibrium all buyers have ,
()=()( − ).
The term in brackets in (2.8) is the number of customers served: 1 households pur-
chase from the ﬁrm because this is their only contact; 22 [1 − ()] households purchase
from the ﬁrm because they contact another seller with have a price above ; and there are
22() households that contact the ﬁrm plus another with the same , and in this case
we can assume they randomize, although as we shall see this term vanishes in equilibrium
because the probability two sellers set the same price is 0.
Figures 2 and 3 show two curves. One is ()( − ),w h i c hi sp r o ﬁti nu n i t so f
numeraire from selling to a buyer that is constrained. The other is ()−1( − ),
which is proﬁt from selling to a buyer that is not liquidity constrained. Actual proﬁtp e r
customer is the lower envelope of these curves. Figure 2 illustrates the case in which the
constraint  ≤  is not very tight, and the price that maximizes proﬁt per customer is
 = (1 − ). Figure 3 illustrates the case in which the constraint is tighter, and the
price that maximizes proﬁt per customer is  =ˆ . The proﬁt-maximizing price in general
is 
 =m a x {(1 − ) ˆ }, which we call the monopoly price. Each ﬁrm chooses  to
maximize Π(). Therefore, a price distribution  () is consistent with proﬁt maximization
by all ﬁrms when Π() is maximized by every  on the support of ,d e n o t e dF.I no t h e r




 Π() ∀ ∈ F, (2.9)
The following result characterizes  by adapting the arguments in Burdett and Judd
(1983), which apply even though the environment diﬀerent because the BJ good is divisible
13and because buyers can be liquidity constrained. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: The unique price distribution consistent with proﬁt maximization by all











with support F =[ 







 ) and  = 

  (2.11)
The price distribution is continuous, intuitively, because if it had a mass point at some
0,s a y ,aﬁrm posting 0 could increase proﬁt by changing to 0 − ,a st h i sl e a v e sp r o ﬁt
per customer approximately constant and increases sales by a discrete amount. The support
F is connected, intuitively, because if it had a gap between 0 and 1,s a y ,aﬁrm posting
0 could increase proﬁts by changing to 1,a st h i sd o e sn o tr e d u c et h en u m b e ro fs a l e sa n d




{1 +2 2 [1 − ()]}() (2.12)
The closed form in (2.10) is derived as follows: Π∗
 =( 1)(
 ) since 
 ∈ F;e q u a t i n g
this to (2.12), we solve for  ().
2.3 Equilibrium
We are now in the position to deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1: Given a process {}, an equilibrium Σ∗ is a (bounded and nonnegative)
sequence of AD quantities {∗
 ∗
 ˆ ∗
}, BJ decision rules {∗








) solves the household’s AD problem, and in particular ˆ ∗
 satisﬁes (2.7);
2. ∗
( ˆ ) solves the household’s BJ problem as described in (2.5);
3. ∗








4.  implies market clearing, ˆ ∗
 = .
14As mentioned above, we are mostly interested here in stationary outcomes, which makes
sense when policy is stationary, +1 =  ∀ for some constant . Assuming this is the
case, we have the following:
Deﬁnition 2: A stationary monetary equilibrium is an equilibrium where all nominal vari-





 () and ∗
+1()=∗
(), which means that the real
distribution of BJ prices and the BJ decision rule are time invariant. It also implies a
constant inﬂation rate  =  and nominal interest rate 1+ = .
To deﬁne some terminology, classical neutrality means the following: suppose we have an
equilibrium Σ, and we change  to 0
 = Θ ∀ for some Θ  0. Then there exists an
equilibrium Σ0 where all nominal variables increase by a factor Θ — e.g., 0
 = Θ, 
0
 = Θ
etc. — while all real variable are the same — e.g., 0
 =  etc. Clearly, in this model, equilibria
(stationary or otherwise) display neutrality in this sense. This merely says that units do
not matter. Later we consider another notion of neutrality, given an unexpected change in
. In any case, we emphasize that neutrality does not imply superneutrality: changing the
growth rate  in the rule +1 =  does have real eﬀe c t s .A l s on o t et h a ti nas t a t i o n a r y
monetary equilibrium it is equivalent to choose the money growth rare ,t h ei n ﬂation rate
 or the nominal interest rate  as a policy instrument.
We establish the existence of a stationary monetary equilibrium formally in Appendix B,
but here we give the basic idea behind the argument. First, we show that prices posted in the
BJ market are decreasing, in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, with respect to
t h ea m o u n to fm o n e yﬁrms expect households to carry. Intuitively, if households have more
money the liquidity constraint is relaxed, which increases proﬁta tl o w - p r i c eﬁrms relative
to high-price ﬁrms, because the former are where the constraint binds; so, to keep ﬁrms
indiﬀerent between low and high prices, the distribution must shift to reduce the number of
customers served by low- relative to high-price ﬁrms. Then we prove the amount of money
carried by households is decreasing with respect to prices in the BJ market. Intuitively, if
prices are higher, in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, a household has a lower
probability of meeting a low-price seller and hence a lower probability of being liquidity
constrained, so the value of money in the BJ market falls. It follows that the amount
15of money households carry is a monotone function of the amount ﬁrms expect them to
carry. Moreover, the amount of money households carry is bounded. Hence, from a ﬁxed
point theorem of Tarski (1955), there exists an ∗
 such that: (1) ∗
 solves the households’
problem given ∗
 ;a n d( 2 )∗
 is the BJ price distribution given ∗
.G i v e n∗
 and ∗
 we
easily get all the other endogenous variables.
Proposition 2: A stationary monetary equilibrium exists.
3S t i c k y P r i c e s
Equilibrium uniquely pins down the aggregate BJ price distributions for all  —b o t hr e a la n d
nominal — but not the price of any individual ﬁrm, since by deﬁnition equilibrium implies
the same proﬁtf r o ma n y ∈ F. Figure 4 illustrates the implications for the dynamics of
the distribution and individual prices when 1,b ys h o w i n g∗
 and ∗
+1.A l lﬁrms with
prices in the vertically shaded area must change between  and +1 ,s i n c ef o rt h e m does
not maximize Π+1 (), even though it did maximize Π ().T h e ﬁrms in the horizontally
shaded area, however, are indiﬀerent between keeping price constant and posting a new price
in [
+1+1]. The only equilibrium restriction on the individual price dynamics between 
and  +1is that the aggregate distribution at  +1has to be ∗
+1.
Deﬁnition 3: In a stationary monetary equilibrium, a repricing policy ∗
+1() is admissible
if, when the distribution at  is ∗
 () and all ﬁrms follow policy ∗
+1(), the distribution at
 +1is ∗
+1().
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to stationary outcomes, and the case
1. We also focus on repricing policies of the following form:
if   ∈ F+1 then ∗
+1()=0
if  ∈ F+1 then ∗
+1()=
½
 with prob 
0 with prob 1 − 
(3.1)
where 0 ∈ F+1 is a proﬁt-maximizing price at +1, determined as discussed below. The pa-
rameter  is a probability used as a tie-breaking rule: if you are indiﬀerent between changing
and not changing your price, you randomize. Although this may bear a superﬁcial resem-
blance to Calvo pricing, we cannot emphasize strongly enough that it could not be more
diﬀerent. With Calvo pricing, ﬁrms may be desperate to change , but are only allowed to
16do so with some probability each period. Here, any ﬁrm that wants to change  can and
will; only those who are genuinely indiﬀerent may randomize.
The only additional structure we impose on repricing is symmetry. This means that,
ﬁrst, that all sellers use the same , and second, that those who reprice between  and  +1
all draw a new 0 from the same distribution, say +1 (0). We now show that once  is
speciﬁed +1 (0) is pinned down uniquely. To begin, note that in stationary equilibrium
+1 ()= (), which says that when inﬂation is  the probability of ﬁnding a price
below  today is the same as the probability of ﬁnding price below  tomorrow. What kind
of repricing distribution makes this happen?


















(1 − )+1 ()+
h












fall oﬀ the support between  and  +1and they all reprice using +1 ();a





do not fall oﬀ the support and do not have to reprice, but do so





with price below  do not
have to reprice and choose not to with probability . Algebra yields
+1 ()=
h













Similarly, for  we similarly have
+1 ()=
h


















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


































´ if  ∈ ()
(3.2)
Given inﬂation , which is a policy variable, and any tie-breaking rule , the unique repricing
17distribution that keeps the real price distribution constant is (3.2). The equilibrium law of


































+1() if  ≥ 

(3.3)
We have established the following result.
Proposition 3: The pricing policy (3.1), with all new prices drawn from ∗
+1(0) as given
in (3.2) is consistent with stationary monetary equilibrium ∀ ∈ [01].
The class of repricing policies (3.1) is not exhaustive, but is captures a wide range of
behavior in a parsimonious way. For  =1 , (3.1) describes an extreme case in which ﬁrms
only change  when it is no longer proﬁt maximizing, giving the smallest fraction of price
changes and highest average price duration consistent with equilibrium. For  =0 ,w eh a v e
t h eo p p o s i t ee x t r e m ei nw h i c hﬁrms change  in every period, giving the largest fraction of
changes and the lowest average duration consistent with equilibrium. As  increases from 0
to 1, the frequency of changes and the average price duration move from one extreme to the
other. For any , we now compute this frequency and average price duration.
The distribution of new prices in period  is ∗
().L e t denote the largest integer such




) of new prices are in
[−1
 
],a n daf r a c t i o n1 − ∗
(
) are in [
].E a c h ∈ [−1
 ] changes
at  +  and not before with probability −1(1 − ),  =1 2 − 1, and will change in
period + with probability −1. Therefore, the average duration of prices in [−1
 ]
is (1−)+2(1−)++−1 =( 1−)(1−).E a c h ∈ [
] will change at +
with probability −1(1−),  =1 2,a n da t+ +1with probability .T h e r e f o r e ,
the average duration in the interval [
] is (1 − +1)(1 − ).T h e o v e r a l l a v e r a g e

























i 1 − +1
1 − 
 (3.4)
Since (1 − )(1 − ) is increasing in  and ,a n d∗
 is increasing in  in the ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance sense, () is increasing in .
18We now compute the fraction of prices that change between  and  +1 , starting from
∗
 ().Af r a c t i o n∗
 (
) of prices are in [

], and each of these change between  and
 +1with probability 1. A fraction 1 − ∗
 (
) are in [
], and each of these change
between  and +1with probability 1−. The overall fraction of prices that change between












with Φ() decreasing in .
We next compute the distribution of the magnitude of price changes. The density of ﬁrms
that post  at  and a diﬀerent price at +1is 0∗




.A m o n gt h eﬁrms that post  an e w at  +1 ,af r a c t i o n∗
+1 [(1 + )] increase

















From (3.2) and (3.6), it is immediate that (0)  0 for all 1.
Proposition 4: A stationary monetary equilibrium Σ∗ together with a repricing policy ∗
+1
yields an average price duration () and a frequency of price changes Φ(), with ()
increasing and Φ() is decreasing in .T h e r e i s a ∗  1 such that  ∈ (1 ∗) and
 ∈ (01], ()  1 and Φ()  1.F o ra l l ∈ (1 ∗) and  ∈ [01), the fraction of negative
price changes, is (0)  0
Proof :S e eA p p e n d i xC .
The result tells us that , unless the growth rate of money is too high, the model is
consistent with the observation that some ﬁrms stick to their prices for some time despite a
constantly changing aggregate price level.10 Our model delivers this result not because there
are technological restrictions on price adjustment, but because standard search frictions
imply an interval of prices all of which maximize proﬁt. It is also consistent with the
observation that some ﬁrms lower their price despite a constantly increasing aggregate price
level. It also delivers this result because of search frictions, and not because of idiosyncratic
10Obviously, if inﬂation is too high, all ﬁrm must repreice every period. If, e.g., we start at  with prices
in F =[ 1 2], and double the money supply between  and +1,t h es u p p o r tm o v e st oF+1 =[ 2 4],a n dt h e
set of agents with  ∈ F ∪ F+1 has measure 0.
19shocks. More broadly, the results show that one should be cautious about making inferences
concerning the existence or degree of menu costs and related restrictions on the timing of price
changes from the observed stickiness of individual prices. Similarly, one should be cautious
about making inferences concerning idiosyncratic productivity shocks from observed price
changes.
Perhaps most importantly, one should be very cautious about making policy recommen-
dations based on these observations. Some ﬁrms may well stick to the same nominal  for
many periods, but this cannot be exploited by policy in out economy. Government cannot,
e.g., increase short-run production or consumption through an unexpected increase in .
If we were to unexpectedly double the stock of money at the opening of the AD market,
the  that each household carries into BJ would double, and so would the distribution of
nominal prices in that market. Theory — i.e., utility maximization, proﬁt maximization and
equilibrium taken together — pins down uniquely the distribution of real prices here, and
doubling  does not aﬀect this. Similarly, the amount of money agents bring back to the
AD market doubles, but the value of this money  is cut in half. This is classical neutrality.
Expanding  is neutral, intuitively, because while the price posted by some sellers can
be rigid in the short run, the aggregate distribution  is perfectly ﬂexible. This contrasts
sharply with what would happen if their were positive menu costs or if sellers were only
allowed to change with probability less than 1. In these cases, if we unexpectedly double ,
it is not possible in general to keep the distribution of real prices constant — e.g., suppose
the support goes from F =[ 1 2] to [24] after  doubles. This requires ﬁrms to change
their prices with probability 1, and in our model they do. But if a fraction of sellers are not
allowed to change  after a shock to , as in Calvo-style models, or if some sellers have a
high enough cost to changing , as in Mankiw-style models, they are stuck with prices that
are too low and do not maximize proﬁt. This obviously does aﬀect the real outcome and
welfare. Without working through the details, it is clear that many households are going
to ﬁnd BJ goods going at bargain-basement prices and, in general will demand more, which
might force the ﬁrms to supply more, depending on how one speciﬁes the details.11
11A detail we mention here is that, in the above description of the environment, we said sellers buy
inventories in AD and bring them to BJ, with expectations about how much they will sell.that are correct
with probability 1. This cannot happen if  doubles and the nominal distribution does not — but whether
20Although the exact outcome may depend on details, the general conclusions are very
robust. In Head et al. (2011), e.g., we present an indivisible goods version of the model,
where there is no scope for changes in money to aﬀect production or consumption on the
intensive margin, but introduce a participation condition: households must pay a ﬁxed cost to
enter the BJ market, analogous to the free-entry condition for ﬁrms to enter the labor market
in Pissarides (2000). With Calvo- or Mankiw-style pricing, a increase in  that catches
sellers by surprise means many real prices too low from a proﬁt maximizing perspective,
and generally we expect this to increases entry of households into the BJ market. That is,
when sellers cannot change their prices, even though they would like to, monetary policy
can instigate a shopping spree by households in search (literally) of bargains, and this sets
oﬀ a production boom if sellers are obliged to meet demand, as in most sticky-price models.
Symmetrically, a fall in  can lead to a slump in Calvo- or Makiw-style models. Neither a
boom nor a slump occurs in our setup under these policy scenarios, where prices are reset
quickly, even though in normal times many prices may be reset only gradually. Our economy
has the property that nominal magnitudes do not matter, real magnitudes do.12
4 Quantitative Evaluation
We have a theory of nominal rigidities that relies on search frictions in product markets,
not on the existence of technological frictions to repricing. In this section, we ask if the
theory can account for the empirical evidence. While our model delivers equilibrium price
distributions, we choose to look at equilibrium price-change distributions instead, since many
macroeconomists have been focusing on the latter of late. Still it is worth mentioning that
future work could analyze price distributions. The labor-market version of Burdett-Judd, the
this results in ﬁrms stocking out, or somehow producing additional output, is something we do not go into
here. The point is simply that something other than the expected equilibrium has to happen. If we assume
sellers can produce  (as opposed to selling out of inventory), and that they are obliged to do so for everyone
that pays the posted price, as in most Keynesian models, then a surprise increase (decrease) in  can raise
(lower) consumption and output with Calvo- or Mankiw-style models. By contrast, in our model, the real
allocation is not aﬀected by the policy under consideration.
12Two points bear repeating. First, the goal is not to prove that money is neutral in the real world; it is
to prove that observed price stickiness does not logically imply nonneutralities, nor does it logically imply
technological restrictions on repricing are needed for theories to match the data. Second, while the level of
 does not matter, the growth rate  does. In the interest of space we do not go into details, but see Wang
(2011) for an extended analysis of the eﬀects of inﬂation on allocations and welfare in a version of our model.
21Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model, e.g., has been applied to study wage (not wage-change)
distributions. While the simplest Burdett-Morrtensen models do not ﬁx the facts well, much
has been learned from the eﬀort, and the models have been adapted and extended to do
much better. Something similar could help us learn about product markets. But for this
project we instead look at the evidence on price changes, as described in a representative
study by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) (see Klenow and Malin 2010 for a survey of related
empirical work).
For our purposes, in terms of preferences and technology, we need to specify the discount
factor , the utility function for the BJ good ()=1−(1 − ),a n di t st h em a r g i n a l
cost, which we normalize to  =1 . We do not need to specify utility for the AD good
(), although it may be needed to see how well the model ﬁts observations other than
those on which we focus. It can, e.g., aﬀect the model-generated money demand curve —
the relationship between  and real balances — which one can compare to the data. This is
studied in an extension of the framework by Wang (2011), where the model does reasonably
well on this dimensions, so we concentrate on other issues. In particular, we concentrate
on repricing behavior, as described by a function ∗
+1() with parameter .W e a l s o
need to parameterize search frictions, as described by ,w h e r e is the probability that a
household contacts  ﬁrms,  =0 12. We restrict attention to the case where each household
attempts to solicit two price quotes from BJ market, each of which succeeds independently
with probability .T h u s ,0 =( 1−)2, 1 =2 ( 1−) and 2 = 
2.F i n a l l y ,t h em o n e t a r y
policy is described by the growth rate of money , but as we said above this is equivalent to
targeting inﬂation or nominal interest rates.
We calibrate the model to the US economy over the period 1988-2004. We interpret the
BJ market as the retail sector and the AD market as an intermediate goods sector. We
choose the model period to be a month, and set  so that the annual real interest rate
matches the average in the data, 1035. We set  so that the annual inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nt h e
model matches that in the data, 103.W e t h e n c h o o s e  and  to minimize the distance
between the model-generated distribution of price changes in the BJ market () and its
empirical counterpart for the retail sector, as described by Klenow-Kryvtsov. Finally, we
choose  s ot h a tt h ea v e r a g em a r k u pi nt h eB Jm a r k e ti s30 p e r c e n t ,w h i c hi sa na v e r a g e
22across retailers in the survey data discussed in Faig and Jerez (2005). After calibrating
the parameters, the predictions of the model regarding price-changes in the BJ market are
uniquely pinned down. There is a simple intuition behind our calibration strategy for 
and .T h e p a r a m e t e r  determines the elasticity of proﬁt per customer (). Hence, 
aﬀects the distribution ∗
 (), and therefore the price-change distribution (). Similarly,
 determines the probability that a ﬁrm does not adjust its price when indiﬀerent, and so
aﬀects the distribution of prices among ﬁrms that do not change, and hence the distribution
among those that do ∗
(), and hence the distribution of price changes ().
4.1 Results
The bottom line is that our theory of price rigidity can account quite well for the empirical
behavior of prices. According to the data analyzed by Klenow-Kryvtsov, the average duration
of a price in the retail sector is between 68 and 104 months, depending on whether temporary
sales and product substitutions are interpreted as price changes: if both are both interpreted
as price changes, the average duration of a price is 68; if product substitutions are interpreted
as price changes but temporary sales are not, the average duration is 86; and if neither are
interpreted as price changes, the average duration is 104. The average duration of a price
predicted by the model, given an inﬂation rate of 3 percent and a calibrated value of  =0 93,
is 116 months. We did not calibrate to this number. Heuristically, the two parameters  and
 are set to try to match the price-change distribution, and the predicted duration happens
to come out 116, which is on the high end of the range given by Klenow-Kryvtsov, but
still very reasonable. Obviously, for higher values of  average duration increases, up to a
maximum of 34 months, and for lower values of  average price duration falls, down to a
minimum of 1.W i t h  =0 91 we generate an average duration at the lower end of the
range, 68 months Also, note that average duration is decreasing with respect to inﬂation,
as inﬂation increases the fraction of prices that exit the support F each period. See Figure
5.13
13At zero inﬂation, the model has a lot of indeteminacy depending on  (although, again, once  is speciﬁed
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium repricing distribution ). Thus, with no inﬂation sellers can reprice
each period or never. But as inﬂation increases the indeteminacy diminishes quickly, as can be seen in Figure
5 from the minimum price duration curve becoming fairly low even for moderate inﬂation rates.
23One can consider the ability of the model to match the average duration of prices an
independent check on the calibration, which was targeted to the histogram of price changes.
One can also ask how well calibration matches this target. The blue histogram in Figure
6 is the empirical price-change distribution from Klenow-Kryvtsov, while the red histogram
is the distribution predicted by the model. One can immediately see they are very close.
Three features of the empirical distribution are worth emphasizing. First, the average price
change is large, around 11 percent. Second, despite the large average, many price changes
are small, with 44 percent smaller than 5 percent in absolute value. Third, many price
changes are negative, around 35. This is problematic for a simple menu-cost story, since the
large average change suggests large menu costs, but that is inconsistent with so many small
and negative changes. Klenow and Krystov (2008), Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan
(2006) interpret the existence of many small and negative price changes as evidence of large
and frequent shocks to individual seller’s idiosyncratic productivity.14
For our model-generated price-change distribution, the average absolute value is 9 per-
cent, the fraction of changes between −5 and +5 percent is 43 percent, and the fraction of
negative price changes is 35 percent. We capture the empirical distribution quite well with
no seller-speciﬁc productivity shocks. According to our theory, average price changes are
large because search frictions create a lot of dispersion in the equilibrium distribution. The
price posted by a ﬁrm at the 90th percentile of the distribution, e.g., is approximately double
that posted at the 10th percentile. Hence, when  exits the support F,o na v e r a g eﬁrms
make a large adjustment. Many price changes are small, however, because there are many
ﬁrms that change  before it exits F, and for the same reason many changes are negative.
Once can describe several other features of the data that the model matches well, including
t h ef a c tt h a tw h e nt w oﬁrms reprice at the same  they typically no not both adjust to the
same 0, as predicted by at least simple menu-cost models. Of course one may be able to get
a less-simple menu-cost model to do better; we only mention that we do not need any bells
or whistles here, as the most basic version of the theory does fairly well.
14We are sympathetic to the idea that one may be able to account for some of these observations by
sellers sometimes moving prices around to uncover information about demand, costs etc. (learning by
experimenting). This has little to do with monetary neutrality, however, since presumably what they care
about is real demand, costs etc.
24Klenow-Kryvtsov estimate the relationship between the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts
its price for a given item — i.e., the price-change hazard — and the time since the previous
adjustment — i.e., the age of the price. Moreover, they estimate the relationship between the
absolute value of price adjustments — i.e., the price-change size — and age. After controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity across items, they ﬁnd the price-change hazard remains ap-
proximately constant during the ﬁrst 11 months and increases signiﬁcantly during month 12,
and the price-change size is approximately independent of age. We do not think these obser-
vations are especially puzzling since, e.g., perhaps at least some price changes are discussed
before implementation at annual meetings. Nonetheless, in Figure 7 the red histogram shows
the price-change hazard predicted by the model. As in the data it is approximately constant
for the ﬁrst 11 months in the life of a price, although it does not increase in month 12.T h i si s
because  in the model has a wide support. Therefore, during the 12 months after a change,
few ﬁrms need to readjust, so the majority change only with probability , independent of
’s age. We do not predict a spike after 12 months because our ﬁrms have no seasonal reason
to adjust, like an annual meeting.
We now turn to the eﬀects of inﬂation. Using time-variation over the period 1988-2005,
Klenow-Kryvtsov measure the eﬀect of inﬂation on the frequency of price adjustments (the
extensive margin) and on the magnitude (the intensive margin). They accomplish this by
estimating the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in a regression of the frequency of price adjustments
and in a regression of the magnitude. Their main ﬁnding is that inﬂation has a positive eﬀect
on both the frequency and the magnitude of price adjustments. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd
that a 1 percentage point increase in inﬂation increases the frequency of price adjustments
by 238 percent and the magnitude of price adjustments by 355 percent. Figure 8 illustrates
the predictions of our model. According to the model, an increase in inﬂation increases both
the frequency and the magnitude of price adjustments. This is easy to explain. First, an
increase in inﬂation leads to a decline in the real balances carried by the households in the
BJ market and, in turn, to a compression of the support F. Second, given the support,
an increase in inﬂation reduces the time it takes for a price to exit F. For both reasons,
an increase in inﬂation increases the fraction of prices that adjust every month. For similar
reasons, an increase in inﬂation leads to a greater average price adjustment.
25It is obvious that at least the standard Calvo-style model cannot match these observa-
tions: the magnitude of price changes may be endogenous but the frequency is exogenous and
as such cannot depend on inﬂation. Our model matches the stylized facts about the exten-
sive and intensive margins qualitatively, but does not nail them quantitatively. An increase
in inﬂation from 3 to 4 percent, e.g., increases the frequency of price adjustment by approx-
imately 9 percentage points and the magnitude by approximately 5 percentage points. This
discrepancy between the predictions of the model and the results of the regression analysis
should not be too surprising nor of much of a concern. In reality, ﬂuctuations in the inﬂa-
tion rate may be correlated with other shocks that are not in the regression. There is still
some work to do on both measuring the impact of inﬂation on the two margins, including
the study of other episodes and countries, as well as modeling in more detail price-setting
behavior, obviously, but our framework gives one potentially interesting alternative in which
to explore these issues.
Finally, Klenow-Kryvstov measure the eﬀect of inﬂation on the fraction of prices that
increase and the fraction of prices that decrease. Again, they accomplish this by estimating
the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in regressions of the fraction of prices that increase and on the
fraction that decrease. Their main ﬁnding is that inﬂation has a positive eﬀect on the fraction
of price increases and a negative eﬀect on the fraction of prices that decrease. This was not
a foregone conclusion, since it could be, e.g., that inﬂation induces more positive changes
but has little impact on negative changes, or vice-versa. They ﬁnd that a 1 percent increase
in inﬂation raises the fraction of positive price changes by 548 percent and it decreases
the fraction of negative changes by 310 percent. Figure 9 illustrates the predictions of our
model. As in the data, the model predicts increases in inﬂation raise the fraction of positive
and lower the fraction of negative adjustments. However, again, the magnitude of the eﬀect
is diﬀerent than in the regression analysis. According to the model, an increase in inﬂation
from 3 to 4 percent increases the fraction of positive changes by approximately 10 percent
and decreases the fraction of negative changes by approximately 25 percent. Although we
do not match this exactly, we are encouraged by the ability of the model to get the facts
qualitatively correct, and think it provides an avenue for further research.
264.2 Summary of Quantitative Findings
It is clear that our theory of price rigidity can account quite well for the empirical behavior
of price changes. First, it predicts an average price duration of 116 months, which is at the
high end of what one sees in the data but still, we think, extremely reasonable. Second, we
generate a price-change distribution that has the same overall shape as, and matches the
salient features of, the empirical distribution: the average magnitude of is large, yet there
are many small price changes, etc. Third, as it is observed in the data, in the model the
probability and magnitude of price adjustments are approximately independent of the age
of a price. Fourth, the model correctly predicts that inﬂation increases both the frequency
and the magnitude of price changes. Finally, the model correctly predicts that inﬂation
increases the fraction of positive price changes and reduces the fraction of negative price
changes. We do not say these are the key features of the empirical price-change distribution
because the model does well on these dimensions — these are what are reported to be the
key features in the papers mentioned above. Our model also makes predictions about the
data not emphasized in the existing literature, including the functional form of the price (as
opposed to the price-change) distribution. We have not studied these predictions in detail,
but in principle one can try to ﬁt actual price distributions for diﬀerent products, since
the BJ distribution depends on micro parameters like utility, cost and search frictions in
particular markets, as well as macro variables like inﬂation.15
Existing theories cannot account for all these features of the behavior of prices. On
the one hand, menu costs theories of price rigidity (e.g., Golosov and Lucas, 2007) cannot
simultaneously account for the average duration of prices and size of changes, which suggest
that menu costs are large, and the large fraction of price changes that are small, which
suggests that menu costs are not large. On the other hand, time-dependent theories of
15It has been suggested that our model makes the prediction that while  may not increase with inﬂation
for an individual ﬁrm, if it does not the  must go up. However, this is also true of many New Keynesian
theories, and at some level is nothing more than the law of demand. A much stronger test would be to
see if  goes up by enough to keep proﬁt constant, which is really the essence of the BJ model. Although
this requires more data, and may be a tough test, we think it is not obvious that it would fail. After all,
whenever a seller chooses whether to raise, lower or maintain a price, he should be aware that this aﬀects
expected sales. The decision to not raise prices when the average price increases is tatamount to lowering
one’s relative price, which sellers have to realize increases quantity (again this is the law of deman), and we
do not think it is out of the question they believe these eﬀects just oﬀset.
27price rigidity (e.g. Calvo 1983 or Taylor 1980) cannot account for the eﬀect of inﬂation on
the frequency of price adjustment, because this is a technological parameter. One theory
that matches the empirical behavior of prices reasonablt well is the one by Midrigan (2006),
which combines elements of state-dependent and time-dependent theories. However, in his
model money is not neutral. Based on Midrigan’s results, one might conclude that one
needs a model where money is not neutral to account for the data, and that certain policy
prescriptions are therefore warranted. We show this is not correct, by providing a model
consistent with both the facts in which money is exactly neutral.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have provided in this paper a theory of sticky prices that does not impose ad hoc
restrictions on repricing decisions. Firms are free to change prices when they like and at
no cost. Still our framework is consistent with the sticky-price facts. The model relies on
standard search frictions in goods markets, which give rise to equilibrium price dispersion,
and (combined with some other assumptions about information) also deliver an genuine role
for money. Hence, it is natural that our ﬁrms set prices in dollars, and it is permissible for
some of them to sometimes not change these prices even when aggregate money and prices
change, or when real factors related to preferences and technologies change. Stickiness is a
simple corollary of price dispersion. This is true of relative prices in nonmonetary economies,
and of nominal prices in monetary economies. Contrary to claims one sees in the context of
other models, in our theory price rigidity does require technological restrictions on repricing,
and does not imply central banks can exploit particular policy options, since we designed
it to deliver monetary neutrality. This does not imply superneutrality, obviously, and real
eﬀects do obtain from changes in money growth, inﬂation or nominal interest rates. This
is relevant because it makes it harder to rule out classical neutrality in the data. How can
o n eb es u r e ,e . g . ,t h a ta n yr e a le ﬀects we see result from changes in , and not changes in
(expected) ,  or ?
M a n ye x t e n s i o n so ft h ef r a m e w o r kc o u l db ec o n s i d e r e d .O n ei s s u ei st h a th e r ew eo n l y
consider homogeneous sellers. It is well known that in Burdett-Judd models, if every seller
has a diﬀerent marginal cost, we still get price dispersion but ﬁrms are not indiﬀerent: in
28equilibrium, each seller does have a single target (proﬁt-maximizing) price, depending on
real factors. In this case, a change in  leads to a proportional change in  for every
ﬁrm that preserves their ranking in the relative price distribution, eliminating our nominal
rigidities. But if there are only a ﬁnite number of seller types, there will be a ﬁnite number
of BJ distributions, and in the support of each distribution all ﬁrms are indiﬀerent. This
resurrects our nominal rigidity. We think it is reasonable to assume a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm
types. In the model, as in the real world, the marginal cost of a retailer is the wholesale price
— each bottle of shampoo you sell can simply be replaced by your supplier. Even though our
retailers sell goods in frictional markets, they buy their inventories in centralized markets,
where the wholesale price is the same for all by the law of one price for frictionless markets.
There may be deviations from this law in reality — e.g., Walmart may get shampoo at a lower
cost than many other sellers, perhaps due to quantity discounts — but we do not believe that
this implies every single seller has a diﬀerent marginal cost. Of course, diﬀerent retailers
may pay diﬀerent rents, have diﬀerent opportunity costs etc., but this need not aﬀect their
marginal cost of sales.
It may be interesting to ﬂesh out the details of the above story, but we think the important
part of the message will survive. It might also be worthwhile to analyze models with a ﬁnite
number of BJ sellers, perhaps all with diﬀerent marginal costs, under the assumption that
they do not see each others’ prices (although presumably they can make inferences from their
own sales). Would this also deliver real or nominal rigidities? Finally, we took the extreme
position that menu costs are literally 0 in our model. This gives rise to some indeterminacy,
although we can still take the model to the data. One could study models with 0 menu
costs, and imagine a reﬁnement that selects a particular outcome of our model as the result
of taking  → 0. It would be interesting to incorporate 0 menu costs in the model future
exploration. Of course menu costs that are literally 0 are unrealistic. As Peter Diamond
pointed out after the Marshall Lecture, our model misses one obvious fact in the data: it
actually does cost something to change your price. Sure, just like it costs something to change
your shoes, change your mind or change your password. It is not so obvious, however, that
economists ought to base policy recommendations exclusively on theories that rest critically
on one such cost to the exclusion of others, or on any combination — say, a cost of changing
29your price and your facial expression, not your quantity or your shoes. At the very least, we
hope our results can be understood as a cautionary tale about leaping to conclusions about
theory or policy from sticky observations.
30Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the result in the following ﬁve steps.
Claim 1: Π∗
  0.













where () was deﬁned immediately after (2.8). Since ∗
()  0 and 1,
Π ()  0.H e n c e ,Π∗
 ≥ Π ()  0.
Claim 2:  is continuous.




{1 +2 2 [1 −  (0)] + 2(0)}(0)
Given () is continuous in ,t h e r ei sa1  0 such that (1)  0 and Λ ≡ (0) −








{1 +2 2 [1 −  (0)] + 22(0)}[(0) − Λ]
≥ Π (0)+2(0)[(0) − Λ] − (1 +2 2)Λ
(A.1)
where the second line follows from (0) − (1) ≥ (0).W i t h(0)  Λ and Λ 
2(0)(0)(1 +2 2), (A.1) implies Π (1)  Π (0).T h i sc o n t r a d i c t s0 ∈ F.
Claim 3:T h e
 (monopoly price) is the highest price in F.
Proof: Suppose  6= 


























31Now (A.2)-(A.3) imply Π (
 )  Π (). However, by the equal proﬁtc o n d i t i o n ,Π ()=
Π∗
 ≥ Π (
 ). This establishes the claim.
Claim 4: F is connected.








{1 +2 2 [1 −  (1)]}(1)
Since  (1)= (0),w eh a v e1 +2 2 [1 −  (1)] = 1 +2 2 [1 −  (0)].S i n c e0 1 ∈
F,w eh a v e  0  1 ≤ 
 .G i v e n() strictly increasing ∀ ∈ [ 
 ], (1) 
(0). Combining these results, Π (1)  Π (0), which contradicts Π (0)=Π (1)=Π∗
.















{1 +2 2 [1 − ()]}()
At 
 ,p r o ﬁt is maximized at Π∗
 = 1
 (
 ).B ye q u a lp r o ﬁt, we get
1

{1 +2 2 [1 − ()]}()=1(

 ) ∀ ∈ [
] (A.5)
Solving (A.5) for  leads to (A.4). ¥
B Proof of Proposition 2
It is convenient to rewrite the model in real terms:  =  ˆ  is real money taken out of AD
and into BJ,  =  is the real price associated with nominal price  in BJ and () is
the distribution of real prices in BJ, now written explicitly as depending on real balances in
equilibrium. Equivalent to the concepts presented in the text, we now present:
Deﬁnition 4: A stationary monetary equilibrium in real variables is a list of AD quanti-
ties (∗ ∗ ∗), a BJ decision rule ∗ (∗) and a BJ distribution ∗ (∗) satisfying the
following conditions:




















where ˆ (∗) is the real price below which households cash out in BJ;





∗ if  ≤ ˆ  (∗)

− 1
 if ˆ  (∗)
;












where (∗)=∗(∗)( − ),a n dt h es u p p o r to r∗ is J ∗ =[ (∗)(∗)].
There is nothing analogous to  in Deﬁnition 1, since the relative price of real balances in
terms of  is 1 by construction.
To show equilibrium exists, we now show there exists ∗ such that households choose


















is solved by  = ∗. We proceed in three steps.
Claim 1:L e t∗ and ∗ be deﬁned by
ˆ (
∗)=(1 − )
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1 such that 0  ∗
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1).F o r  ≥ (∗
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ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (∗
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if  ∈ [(∗) ˆ (∗)]



















1 such that  ≤ ∗
0  ∗
1 ≤ . Clearly, (∗
0)=(∗
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0)=(∗



















0) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
(∗
1).








 [(∗) − ]

− 1
 ( − )
− 1
)
















In this case, (∗
0)=(∗
1) for all ∗
0 and ∗
1 such that ∗ ≤ ∗
0  ∗
1.
Claim 2:G i v e n(∗),l e tt h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nf o r in the household’s AD problem be
 = (∗).T h e n(∗) has the following properties:
34• ∀∗
0 ∗
1 such that 0  ∗
0  ∗










• ∀∗  0, (∗) ∈ [),w h e r e  0 and  = ∗.


























Let (∗) denote the RHS of this equation. Notice lim→0 (∗)=∞ and (∗)




 . From these observations, there is a unique solution  = (∗) to  = (∗).
Moreover, 0  (∗)  ˆ −1 [(∗)].
Consider any ∗
0 ∗
1 such that 0  ∗
0  ∗
1 ≤ ∗. Claim 1 implies that (∗
0) ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates (∗
1) and, consequently, 1 −[1 − (∗
0)]
2 ﬁrst-order stochasti-
cally dominates 1 − [1 − (∗
1)]
2. From this and the fact that ()
  − 1 is decreasing
in , it follows that (∗
0) ≤ (∗
1) ∀. Therefore, (∗
0) ≤ (∗
1). Moreover, it is
straightforward to verify that (∗
0) ≥  for some   0.
Now consider any ∗
0 ∗
1 such that ∗ ≤ ∗
0  ∗
1. Claim 1 implies that (∗
0)=(∗
1)
and 1 − [1 − (∗
0)]
2 =1− [1 − (∗
1)]





1). It is straightforward to verify (∗
1)  ∗.
Claim 3: ∃∗ ∈ [) such that (∗)=∗.
Proof : Claim 2 implies: (∗) is increasing and (∗) ∈ [) ∀∗ ∈ []. By Tarski’s
theorem, ∃∗ ∈ [) such that (∗)=∗. This establishes the existence of equilibrium.
Moreover, Claim 2 implies (∗) ≥  ∀∗ and (∗)   ∀∗ ≥ . Hence, @∗  ∈ [)
such that (∗)=∗. ¥
C Proof of Proposition 4
We take two steps to prove the results.




≥ Λ  0,( A . 6 )
35where Λ =2 2[22 + 1(1 − )].
Proof: Households are either constrained in all BJ transactions, or constrained in some but
not others. First suppose they are constrained in all transactions. Then



























22 + 1(1 − )
= Λ (A.9)













































22 + 1(1 − )
= Λ (A.12)
where the inequality uses  ˆ ∗
 ≥ [(1 − )]
1−
 . Combining (A.9) and (A.12), we obtain
(A.6).
Claim 2:L e t ∈ (1 ∗),w h e r e∗ =( 1−Λ)−1. Then, given repricing policy ∗
+1(),w e
have: Φ()  1 and ()  0 ∀ ∈ (01];a n d(0)  0 ∀ ∈ [01).






































 ()=1 . Since the fraction of prices that adjust is
less than 1, ()  1. Finally, it is easy to verify (0)  0 ∀ ∈ [01). ¥
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  Figure 1: Household’s demand for the BJ good 
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          Figure 2: Firm’s profit per customer in the BJ market  
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        Figure 3: Firm’s profit per customer in the BJ market 
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                  Figure 4: Equilibrium price distribution 35
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